Çeviri yardım

Selam arkadaşlar ;

Arkadaşımın ödevi ile ilgili çevirmem gereken aşağıdaki yazı var. Maalesef boş bulunup hallederim dedim ama vaktim yok İş yerinde oraya buraya koşturmaktan açıp bakamıyorum. aşağıya direkt yazdım konuyu. Rica etsem biri bunu benim için pazar'a kadar çevirebilir mi ?

Eğer yardımcı olursanız dileyin benden ne dilerseniz

5. Discussion : balancing competing management approaches

5. Tartışma : Dengeleyici rakip yönetim yaklaşımları

Esnek ve kontrollü rekabet değerleri

In this contribution, we have developed a conceptual

framework to investigate the way project managers balance

management approaches that are aimed at the competing values of

control and flexibility. If they do not succeed in accomplishing

this balance, this may cause problems in the realisation of these

complex engineering projects. Therefore lessons regarding the

balancing of management approaches can serve as point of

departure for recommendations for improvement.

In the case of RandstadRail, the application of the framework

resulted in the following observations:

1. The RandstadRail project was not guided by one management

approach, but by quite a complicated mix. The project

did not run into trouble because a Type I approach was used,

neglecting complexity and uncertainty. Nor did the project

management simply embrace a Type II approach, neglecting

the need for control. Rather we found that various project

aspects were managed using different approaches, and that

attempts were made to counteract the one-sidedness of these

approaches. Authorities and managers did try to seriously

deal with both the need for control and flexibility.

2. The dominant management approaches that emerged in the

project were often not the result of conscious decisions.

Largely external conditions at the start of the project directed

project management. The political momentum provided

incentives to adopt functional Terms of Reference (Type II).

The initiators could not afford the luxury of waiting for the

specification of the ToR. For safety regulation, the lack of

standards and the political will to decentralise responsibilities

for safety ‘forced’ RandstadRail to adopt a Type II

approach. The choice to manage the money and time

dimension by a Type I approach resulted from the incentive

structure, which arose from the combination of the lump-sum

funding with the turn key contract for The Hague. Strictly

money-based steering would therefore bring great reward.

The broadly supported wish to minimise the interruption of

regional public transport by the project also underpinned this

Type I approach.

3. While not being able to control the management types that

emerged in the project, to a certain extent the actors involved

in the management of the project did develop counter

arrangements, thus being mindful with regard to the

drawbacks of the project set up. However, the results varied.

The counter arrangements for the unbundling of relations

(Type I), in some respects, work relatively well. Horizontal

cooperation arrangements for instance help to deal with

uncertainties by allowing scope changes, which–if not

accepted–would have resulted in a suboptimal project.

Nevertheless, the failure to relax the steering on time and

budget, indicates a lack of balance and mindfulness. The

counter arrangements to compensate for the Type II

dominated systems integration and safety regulation

remained underdeveloped. As a result, the drawbacks of

the predominantly functional requirements in the TOR and

the process-based safety approach were only partly compensated.

This unbalance underlined quality and safety

problems, resulting in the disturbances and accidents at the

start of the operational phase.

4. A relation is apparent between management approaches and

the types of project values (e.g. time, money, quality and

safety). The easily quantifiable values money and time were

managed in a Type I way. However, the “soft” and more

complex values quality, scope and safety received a Type II

approach. One could argue that predicting and controlling

feeds straightforward on ‘hard values’ like time and money.

These hard values are easily communicated to the world

outside of the project (“the trains will run again on

September 1st, 2006” and, “the project will cost €500

million”). Pressure from outside of the project consequently

strengthens the Type I approach in the project (“you'd better

deliver”), with the risk of crowding out Type II elements that

have to secure ‘soft’ values. ‘Soft’ values need to be

internalised in both the operation and the management.

Actors involved in the RandstadRail project did pay attention

to quality and safety at certain moments. However, decision

makers did not oversee or did not commit themselves to the

consequences for money and, especially, time. At critical

moments–such as the planning and execution of the

Conversion, Test and Trial Periods–the Type I approach

appeared to eclipse the Type II style at the expense of quality

and safety.

When considering complex, large-scale engineering projects

in general, the lesson learned is that project managers have

limited possibilities to influence the set up of the project at the

start. To a large extent earlier events, external conditions and

decisions made by high ranked officials, administrators and

politicians set the conditions for the project.

However, actors involved in the project management may be

aware of this one-sidedness of the set up and its pitfalls. In our

study, at various occasions they have shown to be ‘mindful’.

They consciously made decisions on how to deal with the onesidedness

of emerging management approaches, trying to

compensate for their drawbacks. These decisions may have

considerable impact on the project performance, expressed in

time, money, quality and safety.

However, this ‘mindfulness’ of project managers will not be

always present, nor does it guarantee success. Sometimes

counter arrangements may remain relatively weak or counteracted

strategies may not be implemented consistently, resulting

in either too much control or too much flexibility. This

eventually materialises into problems in performance, like for

instance the one experienced in the RandstadRail project

(derailment and interruptions).

Balancing requirements for control and flexibility is a

complicated and delicate task and the room to manoeuvre is

often constrained. The set of countervailing strategies and

arrangements to be developed is contingent, project specific

and–given the dynamics of the project–of ongoing concern.